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VENTRILOQUISM
AND THE VERBAL ICON:
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR HOGG'S
"THE CHARTER AND AMERICAN
THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION"*
By RICHARD F. DEvLIN**

In this brief comment I offer some critical reflections on Professor Hogg's proposed
approach to Charter interpretation. I suggest that Professor Hogg's attempt to
legitimize and constrain judicial review is an exercise in confession and avoidance.
On the one hand, he admits that "interpretivism" is explanatorily inadequate, yet on
the other he refuses to accept "non-interpretivism" for he realizes that it has the
potential to unmask the politics of law. I argue that Hogg's third way - that Charter
interpretation should be progressive and purposive - is incapable of bearing the
legitimizing weight which he requires in that it necessitates ahistoricism, circularity
and a retreat into textual objectivism. By way of conclusion, I suggest that we must
abandon the repressive machinations of textual fetishism so that we may honestly
confront the nexus between law, politics and power. In turn, this will enable us
to demand of powerholders - including judges - that they use their power for
democratic rather than mystificatory ends.

0 Copyright, 1988, Richard F. Devlin.

**Sessional Lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
Peter Hogg, Brian Slattery, John D. Whyte, Iain Ramsay, and Allan C. Hutchinson all
disagreed with earlier versions of this comment. They bear no responsibility for the infelicities
which remain.
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And that's just the problem with a constitutional Bill of Rights. It is inevitably a
Charter of enduring super-rights, rights written in delphic words but in indelible ink
on an opaque surface. It turns judges into legislators and gives them a finality
which our whole tradition has hitherto professed to withhold from them. It makes
the mistake of dressing up policy choices as if they were legal choices.
Lord McCluskey2
The problem of the legitimacy of judicial review ...
is a much less serious problem
in Canada than it is in the United States.
Peter Hogg 2

iTjhe Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's decision, nor
has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new law
and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the course of interpreting
other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically has
done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to do until and unless there
is some fundamental change in the constitutional distribution of governmental
powers.
White J.3

Ever since Marshall C.J.'s decision in Marbury v. Madison4 a
fundamental problem in American constitutional theory and practice
has been to reconcile the apparent contradiction between policy and
principle, the good and the right, democratic majoritarianism and the
"deviant institution" of activist judicial review. In the last decade and
a half this debate has taken on a new, vibrant, and urgent lease on
life which reveals that, despite positivist rhetoric, law and

!Lord McCluskey, 'Trusting the Judges" Reith Lecturers 1986, No. 4 The Listener (271h
Nov. 1986) 12 at 13.
2

peter Hogg, 'The Charter and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25 Osgoode

Hall LJ.87 at 88.
3White J.dissenting, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at 531.

4(1803), 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137.
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Neojurisprudential discourse are quintessentially politicaL-5
6
Conservative judges and scholars such as Robert Bork, William
Renquist, 7 Raoul Berger,8 and Richard Posner9 have launched a
major broadside against the liberalism of the Warren Court by
arguing that it is fundamentally undemocratic for non-elected judges
to make decisions and advance policies which are neither stated nor
implied in the Constitution. A host of liberals have, in different
ways, risen as champions of the Court by providing a relegitimation
either in substance or process, for activism 0 The debate, in its
most recent manifestation, has concretized in the quest to develop
the correct strategy for interpreting the Constitution. Once again,
law manifests itself as an arena for political and ideological
struggle!,

5One of the main catalysts for the most recent round of debate was the manifestly sociopolitical problem of the legitimacy of abortion, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6

"Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," (1971) 47 Ind. L.J. 1.

Z'The Notion of a Living Constitution" (1976) 54 Texas L. Rev. 693.
8

Govemment by Judiciary (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U. Press, 1977).

9

"'he DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities" (1974) Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1.
10See Laurence Tribe, ConstitutionalChoices(Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,
1985); GodBless TisHonourable Court (New York: Random House, 1985); Ronald Dworkin,
Law'sEmpire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986); Owen Fiss, 'The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice!' (1979) 93 Harvard L.Rev. 1.; John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theoy of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980); Michael Perry, 7he Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982); Jesse Choper, Jud cial Review and the National Political Process,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
11

R.F. Devlin, 'Tales of Centaurs and Men" (1989) 27 Oigoode Hall LJ. (forthcoming).

4
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II
What is the relevance of this debate for Canada in view of
the fact that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 2 has moved the
judiciary centre-stage and initiated a significant change (some would

say revolution) in the Canadian politico-legal structure? More
pointedly, now that our Platonic guardians 3 have suggested that they
can review decisions of the executive 1 4 and have actually begun to
restructure labour relations 5 need we concern ourselves with the
16
legitimacy of such manifestly political activity?

Professor H-ogg's article is a timely and important
intervention in this politico-legal conjuncture. In response to
arguments by Monahan1 7 and Fairley,18 he has peeked into the

Pandora's Box and raised "issues that lie at the core of contemporary
constitutional discourse - judicial methodology, institutional

12
Part I of the ConstitutionalAct, 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct, 1982
(Ir.K), 1982, c.11.

13L.Hand, The Bill of'Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958) at 73.
14OperationDismantle v. R (1985), [19851 1 S.C.R. 441, 59 N.R.
1.
15

Lavigne v. O.P..E.. (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 449, Retail Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 580 et at v. Dolphin Delivery (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174.
161 should point out at this early stage that my own view is not that the current
legislativelparliamentary process is perfect or particularly desirable -- Canada is notorious for
its elitism and bureaucratic hegemony. The ensuing concerns and critique of the inhrcntly
political nature of judicial decision-making is only part of a much larger radical egalitarian
democratic challenge to the current centralization of power in contemporary society. In other
words, I advocate a plague on both their houses. The democratic answer to "Big Government"
and "Big Administration" is not to be found in a "Big Judiciary'.
17
Patrick Monahan, "Judicial Review and Democracy. A Theory of Judicial RevieV'
(1987) 21 U.B.C. L Rev. 87.
18

H.S. Fairley, "Enforcing the Charter Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just
Standard for Judicial Review" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 217.
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competence, and democratic theory."19 He suggests that the
question of the legitimacy of judicial review is less agonizing for
Canadians than Americans2" and goes almost as far as to suggest
that it is a non-issue. Hogg advances two reasons in support of his
argument. First, the Charterincorporates the democratic safety nets
of sections I and 33 thereby substantially limiting the undemocratic
threat posed by the judiciary.21 Although I have several reservations
about this claim, it is not the main focus of this comment. Second,
and more important for my purpose, are Hogg's suggestions with
regard to the importance of the interpretation debate for Canada:
the judiciary do not have carte blanche; review is legitimate only if
it is "based exclusively on the words of the constitution"22 which
should be interpreted in a "progressive" and "purposive" manner.
This answer, in Hogg's opinion, is sufficient to constrain the judiciary
and therefore forestall any drift towards the slippery slope of the
legitimacy of judicial review. Politics and law therefore remain
autonomous.
I cannot agree.
Professor Hogg's seemingly modest article is very cleverly
constructed. He argues that "non-interpretivism is nonsense; that
interpretivism is a concept that is useful only in contrast to noninterpretivism; and that both terms can safely be banished from
Canadian constitutional theory."23 By demonstrating that both
extremes are absurd, Hogg seeks to carve out a typically Canadian
middle path. Unfortunately, Professor Hogg does not tell us why he
deals with non-interpretivism first. Surely it would be more logical
to deal with the affirmative claims of interpretivism and then

19Paul Brest, 'The Fundamental Rights Controversy' (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1064.
20

Hogg, supra, note 2 at 88.

21 Ibid at 88-89.
221bid. at 102.
231biL at 91.
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proceed to the negative claims of non-interpretivism. To me, such
structural reversal suggests a hidden rhetorical strategy designed to
strengthen Hogg's own argument: he is not as far removed from
interpretivism as he would have us believe. As will be argued below,
Hogg, like the interpretivists he criticizes, is a textual objectivist; he
has faith in the controlling power of the legal text which he assumes
to have some independent, essential existence outside its community
of interpreters.
Hogg succinctly critiques the litany of weaknesses that vitiate
the concept of interpretivism. I can accept his criticisms as they
operate on the premise that the constitutional text, per se, is
incapable of providing determinative results. In other words, the
reasons why one would want to look at the framers' intentions at all
is because we recognize that the text is inadequate.
The critique of non-interpretivism is more difficult to follow.
Hogg characterizes non-interpretivism as "the theory that holds that
the text is so vague and indeterminate that the courts are inevitably
driven to apply standards that are not to be found in the text."24 He
suggests that interpretivists turn to morality or some version of
natural law in order to justify judicial review. Indirectly, Hogg
locates the debate in the context of the larger, but now
anachronistic, natural law/legal positivism debate. Conspicuous by its
absence is any reference to the more radical analysis that law is
politics by another means.
Hogg's response to non-interpretivism is intriguing but
ultimately unconvincing. His argument is that history simply does
not support its claims. He argues that if the courts could refer to
non-legal values such as morality then surely jurisdictions such as
New Zealand and the United Kingdom would also have
demonstrated activist judicial review because they were unconstrained
by anything like a Bill of Rights. Recourse to such extra legal
values would be even more attractive.
This turn to comparative constitutional history is ahistorical
- it mistakes appearance for reality. Although it is true that the
United Kingdom operates on the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty, this is only so on a rhetorical level; or as the realists say,
24ki
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with regard to what the judges say, not what they do. To be blunt,
even in the United Kingdom legislative omnicompetence has been
effectively restricted by a variety of judicial machinations. The
United Kingdom does recognize an implied Bill of Rights. 2 5 More
importantly, through clandestine techniques such as canons of
construction and principles of interpretation, British courts have
frequently negated collectivist Parliamentary policy in favour of
individual liberty and private property.2 6 The politics of statutory
interpretation are reconstructed and legitimized as innocent and
neutral linguistic analysis. Furthermore, Hogg's argument ignores the
changing nature of law in contemporary British society. The vast
majority of law is no longer in the form of statutes; delegated
legislation is where the action is, and British courts have had a field
day striking down administrative decisions as contrary to the
"principles
of natural justice"27 and, even more expansively,
"fairness."28
Professor Hogg perceives bills/charters of rights as essentially
constrainingof judicial activity - they adumbrate the legitimate limits

2SSee for example, Lord Lloyd, Hansard, Vol. 396, cols. 1322-1324 (November 29th,
1978). In Somerset v. Stewart (1772), Lofft 1, 499, Lord Mansfield established that slavery was
inconsistent with English law.
26see J.Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1; Harry
Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative LaW' (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall LI. 1; Patrick McAuslan,
"Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy" (1983) 46 M.L.R. 1; for a
more applied example of juridico-political preference, see Patrick McAuslan, MThe Ideologies
of Planning Law" (1979) 2 Urban L & Pol'y 1.
27Peter Cane, An Introduction to AdministrativeLaw (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
c. 5.
28Martin Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in. Administrative Law
Theory" (1978) 28 U.T.L.. 215.
More specifically, how does Hogg account for the preferences and inconsistencies
manifested by leading British decisions such as Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] A.C. 578, Prescott
v. Bbnnizgham Corporation[1955] Ch.210 (CA), Education Secretary v. Tameside Metropolitan
Borough Council [1976] 3 W.L.R. 641, Norwich CC v. Secretary of State for the Environment
[1982] 1 All E.R. 737 3W.LR. 641, Bromley LB.C, v G.L.C [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 (HI.), P. v.
London TransportFxecutive, exparte GJ.C [1983] 2 All E.R. 262, the "Son of Bromley' case:
Pickvwell v. Camden London Borough Council [19831 Q.B. 962, Wheeler v. LeicesterCiy Council
[19851 3 W.LR. 335 (HIL).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 26 NO. I

of the judicial function. 9 My vision however is different: preCharter,due to both the decentralized nature of legal power" and
the inherent malleability and indeterminacy of constitutional
structures and texts, the courts were not particularly constrained at
all. What the Charterdoes is not to constrain or limit the judiciary
but to further empower them, providing even broader tools to
articulate their conception of the good and the right. It all depends
upon our point of view.31

Having supposedly disposed of non-interpretivism, Hogg
proceeds to develop his proposals for a distinctively Canadian theory
of constitutional interpretation: that the text be applied in
accordance with the principles "of progressive and purposive
interpretation." This preferred method of interpretation is at best
problematic and at worst obfuscating.
Professor Hogg claims orthodoxy by deriving his principle of
progressive interpretation from Canada's constitutional history, the
so called "living tree" doctrine. Unfortunately this does not take him
far. First, we must ask why a doctrine such as this should be
considered a (legal) principle, as opposed to a (political) policy. The
mere fact that it has been reiterated in a series of cases is obviously
inadequate, yet Professor Hogg provides no further guidance. I
would suggest that progressive interpretation dovetails rather nicely
with the liberal desideratum of evolutionary, cautious, and reformist
incrementalism - a political strategy, not just a legal principle.
Second, the living tree doctrine is no more than that; it is suggestive
rather than informative. I argue that once again it is strategically
29

It is of course true that elsewhere Hogg has discussed the empowering effect of the
Charter on the judiciary, [see his ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed., (Toronto: Carswell,
1985) at 652-57] but he seems to want to have it both ways: yes they do have more power visd-vis the elected institutions, but no they are not political. Like Bickel, he seeks to both
legitimize and constrain judicial review.
30

Devlin, supra, note 11.

31

Robert Samek, The Legal Point of iew (New York: Philosophical Library, 1974).
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empowering, not constraining. Is the Constitution to be interpreted
as a rigid and hard red oak, or as a flexible willow? The metaphor
increases rather than delimits the horizons of judicial discretion.
Moreover, it soon breaks down, for the language of the Constitution,
unlike a tree, is not necessarily "natural"; language is socially
constructed, "fashioned by particular people for particular reasons at
a certain time."32
What appears "natural" in constitutional
interpretation is no more than a question of historically contingent,
conventional wisdom, a matter of choice, persuasion and/or power,
not the product of an oracular text.
That Hogg has faith in the constraining power of such a text
becomes apparent when we recognize the terms of his constitutional
discourse. A key word upon which his theory turns, is "apply." For
example, in the course of his reworking of the doctrine of "framers
intent" so that it can reinforce his theory of "progressive
interpretation," he claims that:
...
it is at least equally plausible to attribute a quite different interpretive intent to
the framers ...
that they were content to leave the detailed application of the
constitution to the courts of the future; that they were content that the process of
adjudication"3would apply the text in ways that could not be anticipated at the time
of drafting.

Or again,
The doctrine of progressive interpretation is ...
faithful to the constitutional text ...
based on the words of the constitution.... If general language is apt to apply to a
set of modem-day
facts, then the doctrine of stipulates that the language should be
34
so applied.

Hogg is indulging in the reification of language, infusing it
with a sanctity it does not possess, imposing upon it a burden which
it cannot bear. He negates its polysemantic and heterogeneous

32

T. Eagleton, Literary Theoy: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press, 1983) at 11. Some would go much further and argue that everything we "know" is
socially constructed. Gary Peller argues that even the idea of a "tree" is not natural, but part
of a broader, contingent epistemological framework. 'The Metaphysics of American Law"
(1985) 73 Calif. LRev. 1151 at 1160-1170.
3Hogg, supra, note 2 at 96
34Xbd- at 101.
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nature. This dependency upon "application" demonstrates his
admitted faith in the now widely discredited positivism - judges only
apply the law, they do not make it.
Professor Hogg makes the fundamental error of severing the
subject from the object, the interpreter from the text. This leads
him to believe that a text can have some ahistorical, acontextual and
objective meaning independent of those who interpret it. This is
misconceived. The interpreter brings as much - indeed some would
say more - to the text than it brings to her; she is both consumer
and producer. 35 The meanings of a text are a complex product of
the interaction of the text and the situated interpreter, resulting in
a contingent and unstable equilibrium. The two are constitutively
interdependent, their relationship is symbiotic and dialogie3 6 and
therefore irrepressibly open.
Professor Hogg indirectly attempts to escape this criticism by
claiming that "the words of the text are (to be) given a meaning that
seems natural to contemporary eyes."3' But this, in effect, only
increases his dilemma. First, and most obviously, the situations in
which the judiciary are called upon to participate are precisely those
cases in which no one view is obvious or "natural;" they have to
make a choice between competing interpretations. In other words,
they have to go beyond the text. Second, even if one perspective
could be persuasively argued, the question arises "in whose eyes?" If,
as Hogg freely admits at the beginning of his paper, we cannot

.operate upon an assumption of consensus, then it is impossible to
seek refuge in the "contemporary eyes" position. Once we recognize
the social, political, economic, moral and gender viewpoints of the
judiciary behind those eyes, we are forced to recognize the plasticity

35

Even Rupert Cross almost admits as much :
"It is trite learning that the interpreter has nearly as much to say as a speaker as far as the
meaning of words is concerned." Precedentin English Law (3d) (1977) at 42.
36

Mikhail Bakhtin, Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage, trans. by L. Matejka & I.R.

Titunik (New York. Seminar, 1973).
37

Hogg, supra, note 2 at 102.
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of the constitutional text 8 The ideal of a determinative text is a
chimera, and we are inevitably compelled to recognize that law, like
politics, is a matter of conviction and (rhetorical) power 3 9
At this point a brief example will help. In the pre-Charter
era, in theory, the ConstitutionAc4 186740 provided for the division
of powers within a federal state. Was this text determinative?
Could it provide correct, non-political, purely legal-constitutional
answers to social problems? A brief review of the criminal law
power suggests not. Section 91(27) provides that the federal
government is to have exclusive central control over criminal law.
What would have been the effect of applying the living tree doctrine
to this power? If taken seriously, it would probably have meant the
end of many, perhaps most, areas of provincial autonomy. But other
factors - primarily political - intervened to counterbalance this

interpretative dynamic and preserve the identity of the provinces.
Various sections of section 92 have been interpreted to curtail
federal hegemony in this realm. Thus the contradictions between
cases such as McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors41 and R. v.
Westendojp 42 can be explained, in large part, by the political desires
of the judiciary to refashion the constitution in order to give effect
to their preferred political vision. It is no secret that many of
Laskin C.J.'s decisions clearly reflect his federalist bias.43 By the

38Moreover, there are homologies between this "contemporary eyes" position and the
anachronistic "ordinary language" philosophers of the Oxford School.
39 should perhaps point out that I do not advocate "hermeneutical anarchy," that
everything is up for grabs. There are constraints but they are to be located within the selfimposed myopia of the community of interpreters (lawyers) which, in turn, is dependent upon
their cultural context. Meaning is context bound but that context is potentially boundless.
(Katerina Clark & Michael Holquist, Miklail Bakhthn (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press,
1984) at 218-219). The constraints are political and sociological, not legal.
40Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.
41[19781 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 25 N.S.R. (2d) 128, 36 A.P.R. 128, 19 N.R.

570.
42[198311 .C.R. 43, [1983] 2 W.W.R. 386, 23 Alta LR. (2d) 289, 32 C.R. (3d) 97, 2
C.C.C. (3d) 330, 46 N.R. 30, 41 A.R. 306.
43

Katherine Swinton, "Born Laskin and Federalism" (1985) 35 U.T.LJ. 353.
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same token, the reason why he was so often in dissent was that his
colleagues embraced a counter-vision. In short, the constitutional
text, of necessity, was and is a potentially open political forum.
Constitutional interpretation is politics by another means. As Orwell
reminds 44us, "in our age there is no such thing as keeping out of
politics."

IV
If "progressive interpretation" appears just as amorphous as
anything that has gone before, then this is exacerbated rather than
modified by the second element of Hogg's proposal - that
interpretation be "purposive." Quite rightly, Hogg rejects Ely's
process based theory as being unpersuasive and inapposite as a
purposive model. Hogg, in contrast, claims that each section of the
Charter must be taken to have its own purpose, and therefore must
be interpreted in that light.45 Once again, rather than seeing this as
being restrictive of judicial policy-making I interpret it as being
facilitative.
Although "trite," and despite its orthodoxy, purposive
interpretation has been anything but the conventional Canadian
interpretive tradition. As Eric Tucker has demonstrated in a
different context, at best, the wilful Canadian judiciary has reduced
purposiveness to one of the plethora of techniques which they can
utilize to suit their own purposes; at worst, they have simply ignored
and flouted its authority.4 6 There is no reason to believe that they
will behave any differently when interpreting the Charter; indeed, in
view of the very high stakes involved, they will undoubtedly want to
retain and expand this flexibility.

44

Cited in W.J.T. Mitchell, The Polilicsof Inteapretation(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1983) at 3.
45

Hogg, supra, note 2 at 113.

46
'The Gospel of Statutory Rules Requiring Liberal Interpretation According to St
Peter'' (1985) 35 U.T.LJ. 113.
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On further reflection, Hogg's reference to Hunter v.
Southam47 only adds fuel to the funeral pyre for apolitical
interpretation. He uses this case to suggest that "purpose" helps add
flesh to the necessarily vague words of the Charter. He documents
how the court considered the protection of privacy to be the
purpose of section 8 and this enabled them to determine the
meaning of unreasonable, and then concludes that "all this was
drawn from the single word 'unreasonable'. 48 Once again, we are
involved in language games; the interpretation of section 8
articulated by the court in Hunter v. Southam is not drawn from but
rather imputed to the word "unreasonable." These slippery words do
not limit the judiciary, rather they provide them with supplementary
creative artillery to make political decisions in the guise of legal
deductionism. It is the judiciary who decide what the purpose of the
text means, they impute this meaning to the text and, supposedly, we
have the determinative legal answer. In short, purposes are as
manifestly indeterminate as the text: it all depends upon which level
of generality or abstraction the court chooses to articulate that
purpose. The approach is circular and self-fulfilling; the answers are
hidden in the questions asked.49 I agree with Professor Hogg when
he claims that "the ruling does not seem to go beyond the realm of
interpretation"50 but in view of the constitutively creative and
voluntaristic nature of interpretation, this is probably not the sort of
argument he wishes to make sl

47(1984), 11 D.LR. (4th) 641, [1984] 6 W.W.R. 577.
48

Hogg, supra, note 2 at 104.

49

Professor Peck makes a similar point on a grander scale when he suggests that in
articulating what s.1 might mean the courts have provided themselves with even broader
resources with which to work. 'he Developing Analytical Framework For Decision-making
Under The Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms' (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1.
50Hogg, supra, note 2 at 104.
51

In an excellent example of critical public law theory, Andrew Petter scratches the
surface of judicial discourse in Hunter v. Southam to articulate the unexpressed assumptions
and "taken for granted" animating the psyche of the court. See, 'The Politics of The Charter"
(1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L Rev. 473.
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A third and final example allows us to evaluate whether any
interpretative returns could be gained by adopting Professor logg's
proposal. The issue can be framed as follows: Do the principles of
progressive and purposive interpretation aid in determining to whom
the Charter applies? In light of section 32,52 do the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charteronly relate to the public realm,
what the Americans call "state action," or can they be given a more
extensive interpretation so as to affect interpersonal relations, the
traditional private realm?
Academic commentary has lined up upon both sides of the
debate.s3
Scholarly recourse to both subtle and imaginative
52

Section 32(1) reads as follows:
This Charter applies:
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the
authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; ind
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of the legislature of each province.

53

H. Brun, 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an Instrument of Social
Development," in C. Beckton & A.W. MacKay, research coordinators, The Courts and the
Charter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 1; H. Brun & G.Tremblay, Droit
Consttutionel (Cowansville, Que.: Editions Y. Blais, 1982) at 628-29; H. Brun & G. Tremblay
Drot Constitutionnel Supplement. (Cowansville, Que.: Editions Y. Blais, 1985) at 77-8; M.
Doody, 'Freedom of the Press, the Charter and a New Category of Qualified Privilege"
(1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 124 at 126-39; D. Gibson, "'he Charter of Rights and the Private
Sector" (1982) 12 Man. I.J.
213; D. Gibson, "Distinguishing the Governors from the
Governed" (1983) 13 Man. LJ. 505; W.R. Lederman, "Democratic Parliaments, Independent
Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," paper delivered at a Conference
in Honour of Norman Ward, 'The Canadian House of Commons: Assessments and Prospects,"
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, November 1984 (rev. text January 1985)
(to be published in J.C. Courtney, ed., The CanadianHouse of Commons: Essays in Honour
of Norman Ward [forthcoming] and in (1986) 11 Queen's L.. 1; Madott, "Libel Law, Fiction,
and the Charter" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall Li. 741 at 756-66; A. Pratt, 'The Charter and How
to Approach It: A Guide for the Civil Practitioner" (1983) Advocates' Q. 425; L. Smith,
"Charter Equality Rights" (1984) 18 U.B.C.L. Rev. 351; B. Slattery, "Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: Does it Bind Private Persons" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 148; Y. de Montigny,
"Section 32 and Equality Rights" in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds, Equality Rights and the
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedorhs (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 1985) at 565; John
Whyte "Is the Private Sector Affected by the Charter" in R. Elliott & L. Smith, eds, Righthig
the Balance: Canada'sNewEquali Rights (Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reports, 1986)

1988]

Ventriloquism And Verbal Icon

arguments has demonstrated that the text is inconclusive and can be
interpreted either way, depending upon which canons of
interpretation are adopted or which other sections of the Charterare
read in conjunction with section 32. Moreover, the lower courts
have provided conflicting decisions54 and the Supreme Court appears
to be thoroughly confused 55 This lack of consensus negates Hogg's
suggestion that we adopt the approach "which seems natural to
contemporary eyes."
Perhaps the principles of progressive and purposive
interpretation can provide greater elucidation. One version of a
progressive argument might be that section 32 should apply to the
private realm because it is clear from Canadian history that the
greatest threat to our rights and freedoms comes not from the state,
but from private centres of power 5 6 Moreover, as Slattery
demonstrates, there are even Canadian and Commonwealth
precedents for such an extensive approach. 57 Yet such an approach
conflicts with Hogg's own interpretation of section 32, as expressed
elsewhere,58 where he categorically states that "The Charterof Rights
...
does not regulate the relations between private persons and
private persons. Private action is therefore excluded from the
application of the Charter.'59 Unfortunately, his reasons for such a
restrictive interpretation are of little help. First, Hogg draws upon
at 145.
54Re Klein and L.S.U.C- (1985), 16 D.LR. (4th) 489 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Blainey v. Ontario
Hockey Association (1985), [1986] 52 O.R. (2d) 225, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 599, Steele .; Re
Edmonton Journal andAG.-for.Alberta (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 59, 4 C.R.R. 296 (Aita. Q.B.);
?.v. Lerke (1984), 13 C.C.C. 515, 11 C.R.R. I (Alta. Q.B.).
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1n Operation Disman4t Dickson CJ., obiter, in reference to s.52 indicated that the
Charter might apply to the private realm, supra, note 14 at 459-60 but in Dolphin Delivery,
supra note 15, McIntyre 3. suggested diverse and perhaps contradictory opinions.
56See Devlin, supra, note 11; R. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude - the Jurisprudence
of the Charter: Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct L Rev. 321, at 347.
57Supra, note 53 at 159-60.
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sections of the Charter,that indicate a more restrictive interpretation
is appropriate, yet as I have suggested, there are competing sections
which can just as easily support a more expansive approach. Second,
he refers to legislative history to support his argument, but surely
this contradicts the underpinnings of his own critique of originalism
and undercuts the point of his own progressive program. Third,
Hogg cites American precedent, but this, too, is unhelpful as the
Charter,in substance, form, and tradition, is very different from the
American Bill of Rights. Indeed one of the underlying themes in
Hogg's paper is the effort to provide interpretative space so that the
Canadian Chat-ter can grow independent of the American tradition.
However, perhaps one should not be no hasty to point out
these inconsistencies. Perhaps Hogg is correct. To read the Charter
as applying to the private realm would be more than progressive; it
would be revolutionary, challenging the public/private dichotomy
which is an integral element of our liberal heritage. Surely such an
approach would be going too far, expanding the tentacles of law and
legal formalism into hitherto untouched aspects of human
interaction. Such an approach would be radical not progressive.
In short, depending upon how one construes "progressive,"
both the restrictive and expansive approaches can claim conformity
with this criterion.
As a dispositive hermeneutical concept,
"progressive" is, unfortunately, completely underdeveloped by Hogg
and therefore interpretatively bankrupt. Much the same can be said
of the second element of his thesis, that interpretation be purposive.
What is the purpose of section 32? The question, when
articulated in this way, fails to advance the discussion because it still
places the burden upon an incompetent text. At best it simply
restates the question. At worst, it distracts attention from the actual
locus of determination, the judiciary. The more useful question is,
which purposes do the courts wish to attribute to the Charter? This
in turn necessitates an inquiry into the politico-philosophical
constitutional vision(s) of the judiciary with all the correlative nonneutral values and choices which necessarily ensue. The invocation
of purposiveness adds nothing to the decision-making process, but
rather obscures the other more interesting preferences which are
being implemented in the process -of determining the scope of
section 32.
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VI
Professor Hogg's paper attempts to guide our response and
that of the courts to the challenge of Charterinterpretation. He has
attempted to answer the problem by developing an autochthonous,
culturally specific response that does not simply regurgitate one of
the "remedies" articulated by our southern peers. Unfortunately, his
proposals come perilously close to simply defining the problem out
of existence, to espousing jurisprudential closure. His central claim
is that the text, in and of itself, is capable of providing adequate
guidance to the judiciary so as to inhibit them from indulging in
arbitrary decision-making. My critique has been that he has failed to
develop the concept of constitutional text sufficiently to enable it to
support the constraining burden which he imposes upon it.
Affirmatively, I have posited the open-ended, promiscuous, and
perennially pregnant nature of the constitutional text, and suggested
the political machinations inherent in the deceptively innocent
interpretation. In short, it is suggested that the distinction between
adjudication and legislation is problematic and that the choices made
by the judiciary are, in effect, the same as those made by the
60
legislature.
This comment is written with the (perhaps irrational) belief
that rational discourse can make a difference. I suggest that we
abandon the repressive 6 and mystificatory potential of textual
fetishism which allows power to pose as truth; that we understand

60
M. Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law:. An Essay in
Deconstruction" (1983) 36 Stan. L.Rev. 623.
61

What Marcuse says about one-dimensional language is rather apt for contemporary
jurisprudential discourse:
The word becomes a clich, and as a clich6 governs speech or writing; the
communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning ... Tjhe noun
governs the sentence in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence
becomes a declaration to be accepted - it repels demonstration, qualification,
negation of its codified meaning ... [ihis language which constantly imposes images
militates against the development and expression of concepts. In its immediacy and
directness it impedes conceptual thinking, thus it impedes thinking.
One DimensionalMan, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) at 184.
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language as a process, not an artifact; 62 that we recognize that
difficult social, moral, political, and gender-based choices now have
to be made in the legal arena; that we freely admit that legal
discourse is 'jurisgenerative" 63 and therefore social praxis; and that
4
we proceed immediately to open-ended communicative action.6 I
suggest that we seek out emancipatory trojan horses - deviationist
sub-texts - within the citadel of contemporary jurisprudential
discourse and reconstruct them to advance more radically democratic
forms of social interaction. For example, as a strategy of resistance,
we might wish to use the Charter commitment (?) to freedom of
expression and association to articulate communitarian conceptions
of speech and action as strategic counter-paradigms to those which
currently monopolize our terms of reference.
In view of the nexus between discourse and power,
transformative discursive praxis is a vital element in any attempt to
65
expand effective participation in post-industrial society.
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63Robert Cover "Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4.
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(Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).
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There is, of course, a problem underlying even my own tentative radical proposal. The
whole interpretivist/non-interpretivist debate erists in the rarified air of judicial reflection and
ebony tower academicism; it is far removed from what law in practice means to the victim of
judicial interpretation: the vicious paraphernalia of constitutionally legitimized violence. As I
have argued at length elsewhere, the determinative element of contemporary law is its
inescapably violent nature. See supra, note 11. The violent underpinnings of contemporary law
suggest that it is farcical even to contemplate counter-interpretation because the conditions
of legal discourse are intrinsically destructive of meaningful communication. See also Robert
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